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Abstract: Development-thinking and planning consistently identify religious markers of self-
development as inimical to social cohesion in the Global South. Practitioners in the field see 
any educational philosophy that emphasises the disciplined formation of character, by non-
secular means, as an undesirable reaction to modernisation. Religious or madrassa education 
is identified as an intrinsically regressive aspect of the indigenous social order that limits the 
transition to an open access order society. Using qualitative data from interviews with the 
managers of an NGO and political reform movement in Pakistan, we explore this conclusion 
and ask whether the secular norms of citizenship, often insisted upon by the international donor 
community, are strong enough to challenge residual violence. If they are not strong enough, 
what resources are available within traditional precepts about self-government so that 












The goal of the Minhaj Education Society (MES) is to provide educational opportunities to the 
poorest children in Pakistan. MES is an NGO with a sister organisation, the PAT (Pakistan 
Awami Tehreek); the PAT is the political wing of the Minhaj-ul Quran International (MQI), a 
religious reform movement, founded over twenty-five years ago by a cleric with Canadian 
citizenship who originally graduated in law from the once illustrious University of Punjab, 
Sheikh Muhammad Tahir-ul Qadri (https://www.minhaj.org/english/index.html). There are a 
number of reasons why Qadri’s social movement is of special interest for political and social 
scientists, chief of these being diagnostic: analysing MQI’s ethos helps us understand how 
Pakistan affords a critical space for those groups that are engaged in shaping the security-
development nexus not by supporting but by challenging the encroachment of state elites. For 
South Asia, this task is vital where economic reforms or mismanagement by political elites, 
through serving rentier interests, have ‘generated greater insecurities’ and where ordinary 
people increasingly see their own state as a security threat in their lives.1   
 
The directors of MES and activists for PAT expressed the same grave view of the power 
establishment, both civilian and military, as many other Pakistanis when we interviewed them. 
As a movement, MQI has to engage in Pakistan’s civil society where both non-state and state 
specialists in violence increasingly define how expansive the formal arena of politics is going 
to be. The predominantly lower middle-class professionals involved in defining the morale of 
the movement through ‘third-sector’ development activities represent those political interests 
that are inevitably going to be affected by the damage done by frequent and opportunist 
violence in the general condition of mass insecurity that afflict South Asia’s postcolonial 
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nations. In this specific sense, attending the social imagination of the reformer can test how 
active the revivalist faith of a mass movement can be as Pakistani society typically veers from 
a high to a low democratic and undemocratic type and back again often within the same 
regime.2 Self-fashioned Islamist vanguards in this hybrid regime can attempt to establish a 
monistic vision of human perfectibility, the Nizam-e-Mustafa (the Prophet’s system of 
governance), on the ambiguous constitutional foundation of the Islamic Republic. The 
preamble to the 1949 Constitution, called ‘the Objectives Resolution’ delegates authority to 
Pakistan’s rulers as ‘a sacred trust’ from an original ‘sovereignty over the entire universe [that] 
belongs to Allah Almighty.’  The Senate and the Supreme Court can veto the opportunistic use 
of Islam by politicians. The Senate rejected Nawaz Sharif’s attempt to reprise the military 
dictator Zia ul-Haq’s Islamisation of society by imposing Sharia Law as the Supreme Law in 
Pakistan in his second term as prime minister (1996 – 9).3 (Yasmeen 2017: 23). The use of 
military force, the mobilisation of state specialists in violence, to establish a general limit in 
the space for religious actors engaged in contentious politics is not new in Pakistan.  The Model 
Town incident at MQI headquarters – which we will describe below – recalls Operation Sunrise 
in 2007 when another autocratic general, Pervez Musharraf ordered tanks into the Lal Masjid 
in the capital Islamabad. Children, pupils, as well as other civilians were killed by the armed 
forces. These students or talib were mustered by clerics at the complex from all of its other 
madrassas across the country. Their mentor, Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi, in contrast to Qadri, 
had a long vocation in fomenting jihad with relative impunity by indoctrinating children against 
the native enemies of Islam in Pakistan. Captured alive after attempting to escape, the interview 
in a burkha on national television was the regime’s attempt to destroy Abdul Aziz Ghazi’s 
credibility as a mujahid (http://www.amongthebelieversfilm.com/). In the 2007 siege, the 
cleric’s mother and son were killed at the hands of the Pakistani military, following the 
assassination of his father decades ago. The appealing image of aman or a society at peace 
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evoked by the PAT activists and the MES directorate in every interview, as they ponder their 
practice of instilling akhlaq, or a system of ethics from the traditional Islamic curriculum,  has 
the state’s reprisals and the Lal Masjid as its imaginary counterpoints.  The MES directorate’s 
own plea for peaceful cohabitation is made in this context. 
   
Unlike Abdul Aziz Ghazi’s takfiri (declaring fellow Muslims as infidel, to wage jihad) 
resistance to the Pakistani government, MQI’s ambition, as the name advertises, is 
internationalist in scope in its appeal for social welfare. Volunteers for the Minhaj Welfare 
Foundation deliver aid to victims of war where Muslims are suffering, in Gaza and in Syria, 
for example, as well as those afflicted by natural disasters 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H2WCTeN1Rjs, 
http://beta.charitycommission.gov.uk/charity-details/?subid=0&regid=1084057). The 
movement also delivers healthcare to people in the developing world 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lilibnpJKII). MES, the body that manages outreach work 
through the ‘Education for All’ campaigns during Ramadan to children whom the Pakistani 
state has neglected is also extending its operation into East Africa 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i1BZxGLGJ4c). Qadri’s NGO also disburses the cost of 
weddings for families who cannot afford to do so. This global diversity of activities by MQI 
merits serious attention by returning to their native context.  
 
The PAT workers and activists we interviewed from April 2017 to November 2018 refused to 
disclose the actual number or occupational profile of party members. They confirmed, 
however, that Punjab is their most vital stronghold of popular support. Historically, Punjab is 
the decisive province in shaping the politics of the state. The movement is not new, the Minhaj 
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Education Trust was founded in 1994, the political party PAT precedes the charitable 
organisation and was founded on 25th May 1989. The goal of social transformation through 
individual charity remains the overt ethos; the work is carried out with traditionalist petitioning 
of Muslims to respond to the welfare of ‘orphans and the needy’ by sponsoring teachers, the 
building and costs of running schools as well as providing materials to educate children 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XzxCSVU6QXc). The MES’s public rationale, then, is 
about fostering overt political engagement via an alternative ethos of moral citizenship from 
childhood on, as well as enjoining the Islamicat in Pakistan and the world to fulfil religiously 
prescribed duties in the interests of the disadvantaged.    
 
There is an established consensus in development circles and in professional political science 
alike about the Pakistani state’s shortcomings when it comes to propagating an ideal of national 
belonging that includes all communities. Instead of adding to this consensus, we want to see 
how MQI’s ‘men of words with a grievance’ posit the sociological value of akhlaq or 
‘character’ as a set of ideal practices to challenge Pakistan’s discredited ‘prevailing order.’4  
Akhlaq in the traditional Dars-e-Nizam madrassa curriculum plays a vital unifying role as a 
master concept beyond curriculum design for Pakistani children by the MES, an organisation 
that claims independence from both state and corporation. We document some of the salient 
attitudes among Qadri’s followers to see how they realise this innovation-in-tradition and in 
particular, how they make a strategic place for MQI in Pakistan’s fragile civil society by using 
the precepts of rationality, self-control and social responsibility from traditional madrassa 
instruction to recruit a following. Qadri’s disciples recover rationality, self-control and social 
responsibility, the pre-requisites of secular modernity, from traditionalist norms of discipline. 
The fact that some followers from childhood are now salaried employees of MQI also bears on 
how objective their worldview is going to be. It has to be borne in mind that these impassioned 
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advocates of reform were themselves often-disadvantaged children whom MQI helped attain 
their position in society.  
 
The Dar-ul-Ulum Haqqaniya, a madrassa first established in 1947 in the Pashtun highlands, 
continues under Imran Khan, the current Prime Minister, to receive public funds 
(https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-jihad-university-haqqania-government-funding-haq-taliban-
omar/29092748.html). Mawlana Sami-ul Haq, the chancellor of the Deobandi madrassa 
network, is a member of the National Assembly. Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf 
administration could not govern in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa let alone across all the restive 
provinces without supporting Dar-ul-Ulum Haqqaniya, the madrassas from which the Pakistani 
military and intelligence services have historically recruited men for militias to fight in 
Afghanistan and Indian-occupied Kashmir. Sami-ul Haq also leads the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, 
one of the two largest Islamist political parties.5 These are some of the institutional reasons 
why social struggles beyond the field of politics in Pakistan contribute to what Sadia Saeed, in 
her account of the democratic exclusion faced by the Ahmadiyya minority, calls unsettled 
desecularization, namely ‘processes that emerge when social actors seek to efface the perceived 
distance between “religious” and “secular” domains.’6    
 
We believe that curricular reform insisted upon by foreign state donors today, with its policy 
focus on secular norms such as diversity, formal equality, citizenship is ill-conceived because 
it risks losing the ‘characterological’ focus in the madrassa curriculum that spans both the 
sacred and the mundane realms. Character-focussed education, where the moral qualities of the 
teacher are an example to children, is fast gaining momentum for educational practice in 
western societies. If madrassas form an essential part of the Ideological State Apparatuses of 
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Pakistani nationhood, in the way we have suggested, then the effort to promote tolerance via 
the classical madrassa curriculum – as MQI claim – deserves consideration.    
 
David Gilmartin writes, ‘With the colonial state providing no symbolic definition of Muslim 
community in India, the assertion of ‘community’ solidarity required that the individual 
Muslim himself bring his (or her) inner life and sense of identity under self-conscious 
acceptance of a concept of ‘culture’ rooted in descent and history, and spread by education, 
that gave substance and legitimacy to a culturally independent community.’7 A more nuanced 
understanding of akhlaq is required as a crucial value for those defining not only what is to be 
taught in Pakistani schools. Akhlaq is the means through which the majority claims its 
collective identity. By adopting a critical approach to this data when it comes to interpreting 
the persistent problem of communal violence in Pakistan, we are examining how the traditional 
effort of emulating the Prophet is affected by values of self-actualisation beyond Islam. By 
concentrating on conscience, on akhlaq, or character, the argument goes, we will be unable to 
think of education as a vehicle of emancipation because citizenship leaves morality to the 
private sphere.  
 
The public intellectual Ashis Nandy makes a frustrated observation: the middle-class child in 
the Global South is expected to provide solutions to encroachments from modernity on 
traditional life.8 Nandy’s point is that there are realms of human experience where culture as 
resistance is occurring every day. This is important for the way we explore how MES use 
education in the reproduction of ‘progressive’ values beyond nationalism in the way Gilmartin 
emphasises for a number of reasons. In our analysis of akhlaq as an ethos to preserve predation 
from the state, we note the classification struggles engaged in by social actors who want to 
enforce their own ideal of civic nationalism as a norm.9 The Objectives Resolution is the 
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communitarian vehicle to limit a liberal resolution to the problem of communalism.  Our point 
of departure for analysing the movement’s survival in Pakistani society analytically rests on 
the plausible claim for all inquiries of this kind: the ‘systematic comparison of empirical reality 
(data) with values’ always presupposes that values are stronger than data.10 For current 
development practices in Pakistan, attention to values is a prerequisite for examining how any 
remedial measure combats morbid instances of social involution. This is the case whether the 
aim is, for example, to enhance women’s ability to resist predation from men through 
microfinance initiatives, Islamic or otherwise, to the promotion of tolerance for minorities 
through state education, where cultural overhaul or ‘impact’ – in the language of funding 
councils – is considered.  
 
Before turning to our findings from the fieldwork in Lahore, we want to consider briefly the 
secular bias in development work through education. Qualitative evidence is missing from an 
overtly religious curriculum when it comes to the remedial role education is required to play in 
reducing ‘structural’ violence. This is not least because of what the Marxist activist and 
sociologist Aasim Sajjad Akhtar has dubbed ‘elite alienation.’11 The debate about failure to 
reform the national curriculum is at least a decade and a half old in Pakistan.12 Development 
discourse in Pakistan, without exception, casts itself as a humanizing pedagogy; for activists, 
scholars and perhaps even for some teachers, the hope has always been that education can 
perform a restorative role in the wake of General Zia-ul-Haq’s (1977 – 1988) efforts to 
‘Islamise’ the country by pandering to religious parties.13 These are measures that are now 
regarded by most ordinary Pakistanis as having left them more vulnerable to terrorist violence, 
as Pakistan hosts a Kalashnikov culture after mobilising Haqqaniya talib for the jihad in 
Afghanistan.14 For this constituency of elites, Pakistani citizenship is not an abstract juridical 
concern. The Supreme Court, by practicing judicial activism, can enact piecemeal secularism 
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even as it falls short of establishing secularism as a political doctrine to heal a divided nation. 
This policy of liberal interventionism seems an attractive solution to the problem of cultural 
violence. However, communal violence against minorities, especially attacks targeting 
settlements of Pakistan’s 3 – 5 million Christians and 285, 000 Ahmadiyya, as well as the 
residual violence that permeates the whole of society, finds its origin for these diagnosticians 
in the state-engineered system of education.15 For these observers, the mass indoctrination of 
children goes on apace in madrassas: a synoptic account concludes with the assertion that 
Pakistan’s religious minorities, to play their part in improving ‘the overall conditions of 
Pakistan’s rural and urban poor,’ face insuperable odds, ‘difficulties and insecurities’ because 
of their minority status and religious differences.16 The Islamabad-based think-tank, The 
Sustainable Development Policy Institute in 2002 called for the abolition of all provincial 
textbook boards because they foster an ethnic nationalism based on Islam 
(https://www.sdpi.org/publications/files/State%20of%20Curr&TextBooks.pdf). The Liberal 
Forum Pakistan disseminated these findings for the institute. Abdul Nayyar, one of the writers 
of the report, belongs to the Eqbal Ahmed Centre for Public Education, named after the Marxist 
political scientist (https://eacpe.org/about-eacpe/). Nayyar, a physicist who is committed to ‘the 
use of science and reason to understand nature and society’ continues to find problems in 
textbooks used in Pakistan’s government schools (http://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/05/A-
Missed-Opportunity.pdf).   
 
No one can deny problems exist. One of the obstacles to the inclusion of religious minorities 
can be found in the stark schedule of punishments for blasphemy in Pakistan’s Penal Code, 
especially clause 295-C from 1986 that governs the punishment of those found guilty of using 
derogatory remarks about the Prophet: a life sentence, initially, changed to execution in 1991.17 
Religious minority women, if they venture beyond their besieged communities, remain 
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vulnerable to sham marriages, molestation and attack, despite the passing of the Women’s 
Protection Bill by Pervez Musharraf in 2006, to mitigate offences of zinna in Zia’s Hudood 
Ordinance where rape is still too easily equated to adultery. If 30 to 50 Christians have been 
killed between 2001 – 2010, the Centre for Legal Aid Assistance and Settlement also has a 
record of singularly appalling atrocities. These include the rape and murder of children, of 
clergy, forced displacement and the burning of Christian homes. Towards the political apex of 
society, Punjab’s governor Salmaan Taseer was murdered by Mumtaz Qadri, his bodyguard, 
and two months later, the Federal Minister for Minorities Affairs, Clement Shahbaz Bhatti, was 
also murdered by gunmen not least because of their advocacy for those alleged to have 
committed blasphemy.18  
  
These are the challenges facing the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In the first section after 
establishing a political context for the violence facing PAT workers, we will briefly examine 
how the madrassa as the traditional institution of Muslim learning and the historical locus of 
akhlaqiat (ethics) is subject to the same imperatives as society generally. It is worth mentioning 
at the outset that the emphasis on character-building is not an indigenous, outmoded endeavour 
of C19th colonial values; the instilling of civic virtues by ‘caught and taught’ character is 
increasingly receiving institutional support in the west too.19 Aid workers should not ignore 
how Pakistanis construct a self-image out of the indigenous forms available to them if they 
want to engage those classes that are acutely conscious of predation by entrenched post-
colonial elites.  
 
In the second section, we want to establish a sociological interpretation of contemporary need, 
in the way suggested by Sadia Saeed for the survival of reformist claims of conscience by MES 
since the C19th. She concludes how ‘the politics of citizenship rights is shaped through 
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conflicts between majoritarian democracy, puritanical Islamic positive laws, abstract liberal 
rights, and Islamic justifications for religious equality.’20 Beyond post-colonial critique, the 
challenge in western social science often means paying more attention to how social actors 
define their telos in a complex situation where ‘virtually every political figure has made his 
proposals in an Islamic atmosphere.’21 We can only properly examine failings of Pakistan’s 
banal nationalism, including the potential for resistance to those institutional manufacturers of 
consent in the media, the generals and the clerics, by paying attention to how groups respond 
to secular modernity when it is cast as a political doctrine of development.22 In our findings, 
the MES directorate’s rejection of secularism as a plausible solution to the problem of violence 
against minorities, by instead fostering spiritual self-discipline (riyadat) amongst their staff 
and students, also implicated the Islamist constituency in Pakistani politics. Recent calls by Pir 
Afzal Qadri for the murder of the justices who freed Asia Bibi, on behalf of Khadim Rizvi’s 
Tehreek-e-Labaik, a coalition of hardliners who are using the blasphemy laws of the country 
to extract rent from Imran Khan’s government, would be appalling to Qadri and MQI. MQI 
take these threats seriously because the Tehrik-e-Taliban also killed Shahbaz Bhatti in 2011, 
then Punjab Minister for minorities and a Catholic because of his outspoken defence of Asia 
Bibi (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8-19rQt2-
s0&list=LLVGJS37cY609vsgtELXSeSQ). In the very specific ethos or ‘idioculture’ of the 
MQI, what we clearly discerned was that the men we interviewed see their organic association 
through shared values as a microcosm or ‘tiny public’ within the current chaos that afflicts civil 
society.23 Akhlaq is the bulwark against these forces.  
 
Our study sits alongside a general concern about testing the prescriptive norms of professional 
activists and Development workers by documenting the MES’s associative adventure of 
socialising children to the communal standards of the ashraf (noble) Muslim elites.  This is not 
13 
 
to suggest that MES or MQI in their outreach work among Pakistan’s subaltern classes have 
remained untouched by ‘Eurocentric’ norms of citizenship.  At the shallow level of public 
discourse, the MES management discipline themselves in order to be seen to be enacting 
progressive social change through customary ‘committed involvement’ from educators in the 
development sector.24 But it is also the case that the sincere reconstructive effort by the MES 
directorate and PAT activists, at least from the perspective of Anglophone social science, will 
betray every sign of contradiction, of ‘pre-modernity’ under the pressures Sadia Saeed noted. 





MES officials helped us in our data collection; they provided us with the opportunity to 
interview the PAT leadership. Meetings with the MES gatekeeper started on November 1, 2018 
and a formal letter of invitation was sent to the PAT secretariat. The first interview with the 
PAT official was on November 11, 2018 and a total of six interviews were undertaken over 
two months. The last interview was recorded on December 21, 2018. All the interviews with 
PAT leaders were recorded at PAT Head Office located at 65-M, Model Town, Lahore. We 
interviewed the ten MES directors over two months. Semi-structured responses from our 
subjects were solicited as part of a larger comparative project which was initially about 





We were interested in identifying how the status quo of residual violence, in Freire’s sense of 
a negated consciousness/conscience, may first be shaped in the school. There is no way we can 
provide a complete understanding of why minority rights are insecure in Pakistani civil society; 
undoubtedly, our subjects pursue their institutional goals in a cultural environment of increased 
hostility for ordinary people: state institutions and agencies have failed to protect the 
constitutional rights of Christian and other religious minorities. Having said this, we are hoping 
to shed light on the impasse in development thinking which in its secular outlook about 
textbook material and classroom observations routinely fails to notice the recursive 
significance of pedagogical narratives centred on self-control. The formulation of practices 
may be overtly Muslim but the rationale for these may also be projecting something entirely 
new. The failure to note these is not least because these narratives of Stoical self-control in 
contemporary society occur in an overtly religious context.  
 
We exclude evidence from observational data of actual practices by teachers in the classroom 
of MES schools. Teaching in MES’s growing network of schools may reveal interesting 
differences in the disciplinary regimes of state (haqumat) and faith community (tabka). For 
now, we concentrate on the ethos of MES, how this group ethos is shaped by the views of the 
directorate, of the ten men, who are charged with designing the curriculum for no less than 670 
schools, 570 in Pakistan (the rest in Azad Jammu Kashmir), for the 10, 000 teachers and 150, 
000 enrolled pupils. Although the ethos is religious, children from minority Christian and from 
a variety of Muslim denominations also attend these schools. Most MES schools outside 
Lahore recruit from the poorest households in the rural hinterland. Even though the MWO does 
not solicit funds from donor-nations, despite the conservative equation of secularism with 
individual freedoms that we discovered, its liberal credentials are on public display in its 
flagship enterprise in Lahore, the Aghosh Grammar school: (http://www.aghosh.net/education-
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system/16462/Introduction-of-Aghosh-Grammar-School.html). The emphasis on making 
children both practicing Muslims and good ‘responsible citizens’ is consistent with all the 
development agendas at work in Pakistan. Each of the MES managers we interviewed believe 
that their model of education provides an ideal template of where the nation ought to go. 
 
In formulating the questions for our sixteen participants from PAT and MQI, we were careful 
not to reinforce the problematic idea that the victims of religion-inspired violence will 
irrationally direct their animus to the secular state as the enemy, regardless of the nature of the 
conflict.25 There is no mileage in this old dogmatism by western observers and their native 
allies, those working for the SDPI whom we briefly considered above, those elites alluded to 
by Assim Sajjad Akhtar. Respondents across classes in our research in Lahore – including the 
relatives of those killed in communal violence – did not blame an under-resourced police force 
for failing to protect them or their property. In the city where the MES is headquartered, there 
have been spectacular instances of residual violence taking sharper form against Christian 
communities in Lahore, including in the Christian enclaves or colonies. In the Gulshan-e-Iqbal, 
a public park, on Easter Sunday, 27th March 2016 a dehshat gard (suicide bomber) killed 72 
people, including 29 children. Both Muslims and Christians were victims.  The message to 
Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister at the time, by Jamaat-ul-Ahra (Assembly of the Free) was 
as follows: ‘We have carried out this attack to target the Christians who were celebrating Easter. 
Also this is a message to the Pakistani prime minister that we have arrived in Punjab [the ruling 
party’s home province].’  (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/27/dozens-killed-in-
blast-outside-lahore-park-pakistan). In Youhanabad, Lahore’s Christian colony, on March 15, 
2015, dehshat gard left 15 dead, including 2 policemen, and 85 wounded in attacks on two 
congregations; two years earlier, in Joseph colony, on March 9, 2013, a reported 3,000-strong 




http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/revisiting-joseph-colony/). The communal riot in Joseph 
Colony was the result of an allegation of blasphemy – mentioned by one of the PAT activists 
– against a sweeper, Sawan Masih, in an ordinary altercation with a friend. Sawan Masih, the 
Christian man, was found guilty and sentenced to death by a Lahore court 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/27/pakistan-court-sentences-christian-man-
death-blasphemy). Perceptions about the hostility of a secular world take many forms. In our 
study, we cannot say definitively that Pakistanis are uniquely susceptible to a ‘gnawing sense 
of a loss of identity and control in the modern world.’26 Nine for the Minhaj Education Society 
and twelve open questions for PAT were asked. These ranged from managerial decisions about 
recruiting from religious minorities and women to senior roles; how life experience informs 
MES leadership concerning the promotion of tolerance and harmony between faiths; what new 
challenges face MES and the PAT in implementing the ethos of Tahir-ul Qadri after the 
Islamisation programme under Zia ul-Haq; how the objectives of MQI differ from the Jama’at-
i-Islami founded in 1941; the prospects for reform after the fragmentation of authority among 
clerics or ulama.  All names are pseudonymous. 
 
 
A Context: PAT and Political Violence 
 
Before turning to the educationalists, we want to start with the PAT party workers. One of the 
most vivid episodes in the history of the movement when it comes to encountering organised 
violence by the state concerns an ‘anti-encroachment operation’ by Punjab’s federal 
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administration at the party headquarters in Model Town, Lahore. In social media, Qadri has 
characterised the events as ‘the Model Town tragedy 
(https://twitter.com/hashtag/ModelTownJIT?src=hash).’ The Lahore High Court is currently 
(2019) hearing cases against a hundred or more police officials, including Shahbaz Sharif, the 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s brother, Chief Minister of the Punjab and other politicians in 
the Muslim League, Nawaz ML(N), the ruling party at the time. On June 17th 2014, armed 
police carried out a brutal campaign of pacification against unarmed civilians, Minhaj 
university students, women and the elderly.  There were 14 recorded deaths and 90 injured 
after the use of live rounds on a crowd of protestors who had gathered at Minhaj-ul Quran 
International and the headquarters of the PAT. Tahir-ul Qadri’s supporters had gathered to 
defend anti-terrorist attack barriers that had been ordered by officials in the provincial 
government to be dismantled by the police authorities in a reversal of the policy that was 
designed to protect Qadri’s followers from attack by the Pakistani Taliban. Qadri was 
vulnerable because he had declared suicide bombing and 9/11 contrary to Islam in a fatwa 
(http://www.pat.com.pk/english/tid/28605/). The siege by the police lasted 15 hours before the 
deployment occupied the MQI secretariat.  
 
According to a statement by the PAT, the cause of the police operation was a cynical ML(N) 
sanctioned reprisal for Qadri’s withdrawal of support for the ruling party: 
  
The Taliban had given a threat to target MQI buildings at that time. The removal of barriers meant that the 
government had given an opportunity to terrorists to attack MQI secretariat. The attack proved Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri 
right when he had declared on media that in case of an attack, he would nominate key government figures in FIR 




Sajid (34), high up in the Minhaj Youth League, who has been with MQI for two decades, 
speaks about the way elections (intehab) in every quarter of social life produces sectarian 
violence. This goes against normative thinking about the value of popular democracy. Sajid 
singles out Nawaz Sharif and his provincial government as directly responsible for the Model 
Town saniha or incident by the police. Islahat, or reform first, then intehab can begin, claims 
Nasim (46) because ‘mafia’ multibillionaires hijack the media and buy votes. According to Ali, 
a veteran of 25 years, the longest period of service in MQI, this was why PAT did not field 
candidates in the General Election of 2018. Individuals he also does not want to name, just as 
Sajid refused to name Islamist parties, are allowed to assail state institutions and the judiciary: 
feudal politicians and ‘mufad prast,’ self-seeking politicians, fail to address the ordinary needs 
and fundamental rights of the people. The institutions must endure whilst office-holders are 
condemned. For the PAT leadership, this is why Tahir-ul Qadri has refused to use Islam for 
syasat or politics. For these party activists, the Supreme Court in Islamabad will hear the case 
against the perpetrators of violence, and for four years, for this senior leadership of the PAT, 
the patient petitioning of the anti-terrorism courts and the refusal of settlements offered by the 
Punjabi establishment represents faith in judicial activism as a curb on executive power. Had 
the fourteen dead included Qadri’s own sons, Sajid asserts, he might have heeded calls to 
forgive in the spirit of conciliation. Ali comprehensively points out the failures of each 
government and failure of institutions and for this seasoned veteran, a new ‘social contract’ (in 
English) is needed. For Ali, calls to destroy the State by anonymous forces ought to be resisted 




This scrupulous adherence to due process is interesting. The three younger PAT activists we 
interviewed, all graduates from the MQI’s Islamic College, actually witnessed first-hand the 
police’s repressive operation on Model Town on 17th June, 2014. Shehzad (24) says how 
students came forward to defend themselves against armed police at night on 2.30 am to 10 
am. Intehabi intezam, Pakistan’s democracy, is for the wealthy, he says. All denominations, he 
says – whether Deobandi, or Shi’a, or Wahhabi – are routinely encouraged by Qadri to attend 
aman or peace conferences. They are invited to set violence aside when disputing theological 
points. He is emphatic, Qadri has called upon the Pakistani State to prohibit the funding of 
madrassas, such as Saudi funding for Deobandi madrassas and the Iranians for Shi’a schools. 
He returns at the end of the interview to how PAT has spent crores or millions of rupees on the 
case against those responsible for the attack on Model Town. He calls for a peaceful, sabaz or 
a green revolution through protest – according to the law – to resist police brutality. This is no 
small thing for a witness to state repression. Ajmal (24) reports that his two classmates were 
killed on that night after two days in hospital. They had been shot in the head and chest. In the 
siege, police snipers started targeting individuals (‘straight firing’) once occupants did not leave 
the compound but this student – who has directly encountered organised violence by state 
actors – continues to affirm an alternative to the status quo in explicitly peaceful terms. No FIR 
(First Information Report) was issued to presumably legitimate the police action in 2014 by 
identifying rogue elements in the police; facts in a report by a commission to establish the chain 
of responsibility for the events in Model Town has been ‘gambled with’ claims a district leader 
for the student’s youth wing of the PAT. Ismail (23) criticises the reluctance to have even the 
flawed findings published as to who ordered Rana Sanaullah Khan, the Wazir-e-Qanun or Law 
Minister of the Provincial Assembly in Punjab to authorise the assault. Karim (24) is emphatic 
that low-ranking constables are being scapegoated in the Lahore High Court. More importantly, 
he points to the flaw in the election of the President by a minority vote; ‘it’s the case that votes 
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can be bought [among the poor] by a burger,’ there are three or votes per person. Qadri insists 
on a biometric system, he says, and a box should be on the ballot for the voter to signal ‘None 
of the above.’ And if, he says, ‘the turnout remains 50 or 60%, then the nation is truly asleep. 
But we do not believe this.’ For Ajmal, those in parliament (the ‘electives’) know nothing of 
Islam, not an alif or A. When Islam is separated from the state, he says, ‘changezi’ or despotism 
ensues; the call has always been not to change faces but the system (‘Chehre nahin nizam 
badlo’). Until this fundamental reform is achieved, he says, Dr Sahib, Qadri, will not participate 
in elections. Ajmal relates the ecumenical focus of MQI’s mission: the Christian community is 
welcomed by MQI every Christmas in their own churches, despite criticism from society and 
on the birthday of the Prophet, Hindus and Sikhs from all over the world attend. MES schools 
take children from all denominations.                   
 
 
Madrassa Reform  
 
Since the mid-C19th, accountability structures have always existed to hold management 
responsible to the local community when it comes to the use of donations in madrassas.27 The 
role of the teacher’s authority in traditional Islamic instruction and study techniques is 
changing; madrassa education is not a static form.28 Today, under pressure from donors like 
USAID and DFID as well as Pakistan’s school inspection regime, madrassa curricula are no 
longer defined according to the personal authority or charisma (karamat) of the teacher as 





013/5.%20Madrasa%20Education.pdf).  In the UK, Professor Akram Nadwi has developed an 
alimiya course at the Cambridge Islamic College (http://www.cambridgeislamiccollege.org/) 
and the contemporary needs of Muslim communities are to the fore in training scholars and 
imams in Islamic pedagogy. For example, the C19th Deoband syllabus, written about by the 
great academic historian Barbara Metcalf is being taught in the English language at the 
Ebrahim College in the UK (https://ebrahimcollege.org.uk/).  
 
In the UK at least, madrassa education has adapted practice away from its primary concern, the 
development of character and knowledge of its students according to the moral example set by 
the teacher. Instead, the usually secondary and highly professional concern about 
institutionalizing the transmission of knowledge is now to the fore in terms of fostering 
Research Learning Communities.29 The complex question about the form this knowledge takes, 
especially concerning best juridical practice or sharia, is accorded less significance when it 
comes to adherence by the faithful to a non-Muslim state.30 However, the approach by the 
Ebrahim College in the UK and Minhaj in Pakistan is designed to help schools; the leadership, 
teachers and students are encouraged to use research evidence reflexively in order to develop 
new and effective teaching or other education related strategies. This effort is not entirely new. 
Some indigenist reformist effort to improve the quality of madrassa education, with an 
Internationalist orientation, have been made but narratives concerning akhlaq here remained 
exclusively focussed on traditionally individualised precepts of conduct rather than on the 
collective responsibility owed to people of other faiths, or indeed, to those of no faith. A look 
at the ‘Curriculum Framework for Madrasah Education’ report from 2012 (found at 
https://www.world-federation.org/sites/default/files/Exhibits.pdf.) shows the vast categories of 




Looking at the madrassa curriculum, one notes that the meaning of respect for other faiths as a 
value – in Galtung’s sense of a dialogue to foster a negative peace in the project to ‘de-
westernise’ – is not present.31 In the British context, the core elements of modern citizenship 
for the madrassa curriculum among 30 madrassas were not in conflict with the national 
curriculum in the experiment. The ICE (Islamic Citizenship Education) project claims that this 
curriculum was disseminated across 400 madrassas: 
 
[T]he citizenship themes were drawn from the English national curriculum and then Islamised making the content 
both Islamic and contemporary. Evaluations were wonderfully positive and the final word remains with one 
student who felt that ‘the teaching of citizenship was better in his madrasah than in his school (‘Curriculum 
Framework for Madrasah Education’ 2012: 174).’ 
 
A contributor this 2012 multi-country study can complain that, in Canada at least, a refusal to 
accept a family with ‘one father and two mothers’ means that 
 
Tolerance and diversity stops when it comes to Muslim values…The community is concerned that this 
fundamental religious nurturing is maintained because spiritual needs of their children are not met by 
the formal secular education that occurs within wider multicultural society (‘Curriculum Framework 
for Madrasah Education,’ 2012: 149).  
 
The report does not document how the ten-year olds in Karachi interpreted the necessity of 
jihad. Since the 7/7 attacks in 2005, it is not surprising that the nature of terrorism formed part 
of the English national curriculum (‘Curriculum Framework for Madrasah Education,’ 2012: 
30). Unlike the Canadian cleric’s comments, the British director of the ICE project does not 
report how the prohibition against homosexual acts (‘huddud for liwat,’ literally the limits of 




The secular mindset, then, can all too easily associate bodies like the MES with dormant 
reactionary tendencies. Even more frustratingly for them, whatever the managers of this NGO 
emphatically assert, the political imagination accustomed to perceiving solutions wholesale for 
Pakistan will be reluctant or incapable of disregarding all those covert efforts by Pakistan’s 
‘deep state.’ These receive an airing in public when operations by  occasionally go awry; 
madaaris youth, in this view, form the human capital for the agencies of the ISI (Inter-Service-
Intelligence), a body that is routinely alleged to be training cadres of insurgent militias via the 
Haqqani network at places like Dar al-Ulum to carry out assassinations of enemies, both 
domestic and foreign.  Activists and reformers blame these extra-constitutional measures for 
inflicting suicide bombing (dehshatgardi) on civil society as instances of blowback.32 The PAT 
activists and the MES managers live in a society where some sectarian enthusiastic support 
exists as a political fact. The Pakistani public, trained by the media to take Indian intervention 
seriously does not challenge ISI-trained or supported Taliban militia in attacking embassies in 
Afghanistan. Although the contexts were different, the exacting of a grim civilian toll on 
Bombay’s streets in 1993 for the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, or again on a 
greater scale in 2008 in the same city, by members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba militia has not, to 
date, seen mass public rallies against the Pakistani state. The evacuation of religion from 
Pakistan’s schools and madrassas is held to be key for foreign donors.  
 
The U.S government’s refusal to designate Pakistan a Country of Particular Concern, at the 
behest of its own commission in its Annual Report for 2017, despite a growing charge-sheet, 
represents the fraught but long association between America and its client.  In 2016, the 
USCIRF reports, ‘At least 40 individuals have been sentenced to death or are serving life 
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sentences for blasphemy, including two Christians who [have] received death sentences 
(http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/annual-report-chapters-and-summaries/pakistan-
chapter-2017-annual-report).’ In 2017, the Pakistani courts convicted and imprisoned an 
Ahmadi and a Shi’a Muslim for five years as well as hearing charges of blasphemy against four 
Ahmadis under the anti-Ahmadiyya provisions of the Penal Code.  Significantly for us, the 
authors stress that sectarian [sic] violence from terrorist groups and individuals against 
Christians, Hindus, Ahmadis and Shia Pakistanis is due to ‘a deep-rooted climate of impunity 
that has emboldened extremist actors’, a milieu of hostility which is created by education:  
 
Provincial textbooks with discriminatory content against minorities remain a significant concern. Reports also 
continue of forced conversions and marriages of Hindu and Christian girls and women, although the Pakistani 
government took some positive steps on this issue and made other encouraging gestures toward religious 
minorities (http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/annual-report/2016-annual-report). 
 
The message is clear from these observers from the same Islamabad think tank that called for 
the abolition of textbook boards in 2002: Pakistani children need to be protected from doctrinal 
views about how exceptional their creed is, including from religious parties like the Jama’at 
Islami, to be good citizens. The secular elites consider this story among Islamist reformers 
about the historical necessity and future destiny of a Muslim homeland in South Asia as the 
regressive obstacle that prevents a modern polity from emerging. The Objectives Resolution is 
a symbol of populist intransigence. The American-government funded report simply calls this 
‘bias.’ What does bias exactly mean in evidentiary terms? If we look at the SDPI’s report in 
2011 in more detail, clear evidence for mass indoctrination of poor children in madrassas as 
the prime cause of communalism is not forthcoming: ‘a wide majority of madrassa students 
interviewed considered religious minorities to be Pakistani citizens, and some even considered 
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non-Muslims to have rights equal to Muslims and thought that ensuring their rights was the 
responsibility of the government.33 
 
The SDPI’s view of Pakistani culture that treated citizenship in a specific mode represents an 
anxiety shared by most secularists.   Ashis Nandy writes how ‘One characteristic of the 
Enlightenment world-view underpinning modernity, to qualify as worthwhile, must be 
expressed in a language consistent with modernity, particularly with the demands of historical 
consciousness, the theory of progress, and scientific rationality.’34 The MES directors, in 
contrast, are the intellectual descendants of the nineteenth-century men from Muslim elites who 
debated the future of Muslims under colonial conditions at the Muhammadan Educational 
Conference.35 For some of them at least, exemplary forms of behaviour are also a prerequisite 
for citizenship but for them progress and rationality (aqaliyat) are not the enemies of tradition.  
This structure of feeling predominates among those like the MES and PAT workers who 
occupy precarious class positions. These lower middle-class, highly educated men are often 
excluded from preferment because they lack social capital in Pakistan’s key institutions like 
the army and corporate elites. The emphasis on reason as aqaliyat is the most vital element in 
the positivist values attributed to human nature in Islam; kirdar (good character) under the sign 
of aqaliyat will see their young wards through the race of life. Abd Allah al-Haddad’s (d. 1720) 
allusion to the Quranic verse, in which Muhammad is told by God that ‘Assuredly, thou art of 
a tremendous character,’ (Nabiyun azimun khalquhu l-khuluqu ‘l-ladhi/lahu azzama ‘r-
Rahmanu fi sayyidi ‘l-kutbi) is the rather mundane epitaph Muslim pilgrims discover about 
their spiritual mentor if they lift their eyes above the entrance to his tomb in Medina.36 In 
Muslim orthopraxy, the task of existence is to make nature and character conform to each other; 
the etymology for both is identical in the noun phrase khalq, meaning created nature, or culture. 
For Qadri’s followers, ‘Culture in the third sense [culture as resistance] rejects this stipulation 
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[that western modernity is inevitable] and the assumption that the future shape of all human 
consciousness was decided once and for all in the seventeenth-century.’37  
 
The conservative effort to make nature and culture cohere in individual conduct and human 
consciousness, decided in the seventh century, becomes a vital principle of all self-actualisation 
for ‘men leaving, or deprived of places in a local structure, [who] are attracted to a community 
defined by a shared High Culture.’38  The lifelong educational effort centred on establishing 
hay’a (humility/obedience) as a permanent trait of character, begun in childhood – where 
‘Creation’ [khalq] and ‘character’ [khuluq] are two expressions which may be used together’ 
in Sufic thought – has its long antecedents in Plato and the Stoical tradition.39 In short, only 
character obtains against the chaotic flux of human existence.40 The focus in our project 
remains not on the delivery of curricula based on these intangibles but on the private defensive 
ethos of those responsible for designing a curriculum for over six hundred schools against the 
chaos of Pakistani politics.  
 
 
Education and Violence 
  
It is in keeping with Qadri’s overtly political agenda with its reformist outlook to see no 
inconsistency in what the political philosopher of Shari’a or Muslim legal practice, Wael 
Hallaq, describes as the ‘totalizing subjectivity’ created by the modern state.41 The practices of 
faith, of akhlaq, are essential in fostering a metaphysical solidarity between the Muslim 
individual with the ideal community of faith, the Umma.42 The normative impulses of 
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citizenship are a late arrival. Qadri, then, is no ordinary cleric denouncing Pakistan’s politicians 
for venality every Friday from the pulpit: in 2014, the year of the Model Town killings by 
police, he drew crowds of 60,000 in Islamabad, along with Imran Khan. Qadri had called for 
the resignation of Nawaz Sharif, the erstwhile perennial candidate by his party for Prime 
Minister, because of alleged rigging of the National Assembly elections in 2013 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28817311). In short, the MWO is an NGO that seeks 
a populist mandate to challenge the failure of traditional Pakistani political elites.   
 
The small group interviewed here is undoubtedly responsible for ‘direct constraint’ at the 
intimate level of social interaction.43 In modern pedagogical terms, what else is the ethical 
focus on discipline in education essentially about? Our attitude in interpreting the data is apiece 
with the analysis of the small group as ‘a mediating form’ that ‘[moderates] individual interests 
in the face of group goals and conflicting desires.’44 For example, a director since 2006, whom 
we will call Sohail, when responding to our question about the challenges facing MES, says  
 
We have raised our voice against batal (error), haqumat-e-waqt se jo takar hai (because of our fight against the 
government of the day) and because the state takes money for approving [schools], we are punished for speaking 
the truth… Children are receiving an education in every school but we bring a message of love and peace against 
sectarian doctrines of violence…There are many hurdles created for us…But there can only be aman (peace) if 
there is love.     
 
This is resistance against a sectarian, not a secular state. The conciliatory tone is institutionally 
vital for the NGO. As the Model Town incident showed, the ruling party in Punjab acted 
ruthlessly in 2014 when Qadri was sermonising to protestors atop shipping containers with 
28 
 
Imran Khan during dharne (mass sit-ins) in the capital. But we need to practice some 
objectivity about Sohail’s characterisation of patient non-violence. On 1st September, three 
deaths resulted at the hands of police when Qadri’s supporters, after storming and wrecking 
the national television station, tried to break an entry into the Secretariat, the head office of the 
federal administration.45 
 
Ecumenical elements are present very strongly in the views of the participants. Even when 
akhlaq is interpreted in a more humanist way, it does not reach far enough to separate state 
from religion: the history of partition and the sanguinary quest of a Muslim homeland, the 
activation of the historical sense to cure present maladies, acts as a screen to limit the ambition 
of Pakistan’s liberal elites. Secularism retains its elite associations for the indigenous class 
formation to which the MES directorate belongs. For Javed (24), with an M. Phil in Islamic 
banking, the sloganeering for secularism, ‘secularism and liberalism zindabad (long live),’ 
engaged in by Pakistan’s elites is an affront to the long struggle and sacrifice of 2.5 million 
people; faith, not religion, he says, lends nobility to humankind (‘insaan ashraf-ul-makhlukat 
hai’). Javed cites Martin Luther King’s reliance on faith in fighting for equality in America, a 
fight that still endures; for this young acolyte, the 1400-year old religion promises absolute 
equality: ‘There is no black or white, no white is superior, no black is superior, neither an Arab 
or non-Arab.’ What is interesting in this response are the recurrent markers of social 
exceptionalism for those capable of fostering good character; terms like ashraf-ul-makhlukat, 
afzal predominate and Javed concludes by asserting that ‘he who recognizes his nature, 
recognizes God.’ With zaat, the mystical or otherworldly qualities Haddad isolated from 
Quranic khulq for character, in commenting on the parable of human excellence to be found in 
the life of the Prophet, is now also given a class specific quality in Muslim South Asia. Zaat is 
also caste, class, social position. Daoud, who is 51, and has been working for the MES for 25 
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years, puts this orientation into its native-progressive context. Daoud recalls efforts by a party 
founded by Asghar Khan (b. 1921), Pakistan’s first Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, to 
separate religion from state. He states the following to explain Asghar Khan’s call to make 
Pakistan a republic by separating politics and religion: 
 
But this is true that Pakistan was made in the name of Islam and its existence is also lies in Islam. Politics should 
be separated from religion when religion fails to guide you in politics. When religion does not have roshan khyalat, 
nazariat (an enlightened worldview). When our religion has roshan khyalat [literally, enlightened ideas] and there 
is no harm to applying them in politics. There is no harm in making Islam the religion of state. There is no issue 
in making Islam the religion of state. If religion becomes narrowed and suffers limitations, it should be left aside 
and people should be left free. 
 
For this seasoned observer of Pakistan’s turbulent history, Islam offers individuals the 
autonomy to act as they please; it is clerics who have diminished the enlightened precepts of 
the original faith. Mohsin, who is Deputy Director of MES, is also optimistic about faith; for 
him, extremist violence is the consequence of departing from religion. More importantly, as 
far as the ethos of the MES is concerned, a modern education must broaden the mind but not 
so far that the individual starts to depart from a shared reality (asal): ‘Our reality (asal) is as a 
Muslim…We have a history, we should keep our relationship with that so that a balanced 
personality can emerge.’     
          
Sohail characterises secularism as fasaad (conflict); he cites, respectfully, India’s failure to 
prevent countless deaths as a secular state. For Sohail, secularism is a western imposition that 
fails to improve on the authentic ideal of democracy (jamhuryat) and rights (huqooq), of 
rational dispute between sects and religions that took place in the precincts of the first mosque 
in Medina in the masterful presence of Muhammad: ‘Din-e-fitrat hai Islam: (Islam is a faith 
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built on human nature).’ After his disquisition on the founders of Pakistan as ideal and reality, 
how the nation’s poet, Mohammad Allama Iqbal, and the Quaid or Great Leader, M. A. 
Jinnah’s faith, informed that vision, Sohail concludes that exhortations to pray, namaaz parho 
to people of other faiths, to Christians, is wrong. He emphasises that people from different sects 
and religions came to dispute with the Prophet but their converting to Islam was never made a 
precondition before entering the mosque. The historical veracity of these claims is not the point; 
in meeting secularism as world-view, we see the MES directorate interpret their role according 
to the three tenets Nandy cited as a precondition of modernity: subject your faith to an historical 
consciousness; let it be a product of evolution (progress); and use reason (aqal) to solve social 
conflicts.            
 
Returning to Sohail, secularism is deeply inimical (zulm, a tyranny) to children; teaching it will 
inevitably erode the moral foundation of their character, he says. What is epistemologically 
interesting is the differentiation he draws between those whose native ethos is strong enough 
to resist its appeal and those vulnerable masses for whom a secular outlook will fail to conform 
to nature (fitrat). This understanding is similar to Daoud’s faith in the religion’s ability to 
impart an enlightened view of the world to its adherents. Sohail’s daughter attends Aghosh 
Grammar, a school of 500 orphans (yatim); the same education is given to these children as 
fee-paying pupils ‘so that they do not become victims of any conflict.’ This is what Sohail says 
about what secularism means: 
 
Siwae fasad (conflict) aur kuch nahin [jocular tone]. It is the cause of a loss of many lives lost. Many people die 
in our neighbourhood, with our Indian neighbours in Bharat [India] [in a respectful tone]. If we read Islam’s 
principles, God says that these are zapta hyat [essential laws of human nature]…Secularism [in English] only 
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spreads evil…if humankind [insan] goes towards naturalism [in English], if we naturally [in English] observe, we 
will see that it is din-e-fitrat. And when din-e-fitrat takes people towards education, then they discover their 
purpose. If we teach secularism to our children, then we are practicing zulm [injustice, tyranny] towards them, 
sitam. We should end this thing.  
 
It may very well be the case that out of all Pakistan’s institutions, its manifold tiny publics, its 
schools turn out to be the most important mechanism for passing off private ideals as an 
unrealised and for some, unrealisable, self-image of the nation as a culturally Islamic polity. 
The army, the seminary, the village council or panchayat, the mohalla or neighbourhood all 
function as secondary elaborations.  The historical appeal made by M. A. Jinnah, the founder 
of Pakistan, to ‘the structurally weak Muslim segment of the Indian bourgeoisie’ may be 
continuing apace today, bypassing ‘the entire trajectory of bourgeois nationalism on the one 
hand [and] the Communist movement on the other.’46 This might be why Pakistan is often 
afflicted by gross instances of social breakdown.  For Sohail, Hindi films, Bollywood has the 
power to spoil beliefs in ‘two minutes’; ‘they spoil our children.’ Secularism is the cause of 
conflict for this director of education. But what we do notice, in the shrewd observation by 
Aijaz Ahmad is that an elite nationalism is as distant as the Marxist cadres that make up the 
metropolitan centres in South Asia. How best to use the resources available to MES in helping 
reduce communal predation? We now turn to this.  
 
Both the 32-year old Director for Curriculum and Training, Farooq, who has been with MES 
since 2011 and the older Assistant Director of Education for the MES, Mukhtar, a Persianist 
with a keen interest in the canon of Pakistan’s national poet-philosopher  ‘Allama’ Iqbal (1877 
– 1938), offered traditional definitions of secularism as freedom to practice religion. For many 
ordinary Pakistanis, the best institutional manifestation of self-discipline as the origin for 
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collective solidarity remains the most repressive of apparatuses of state: the army. This is a 
partial explanation as to why survey findings amongst 18 – 29-year-old Pakistanis, when asked 
whether democratic governance has declined in recent years, prefer solutions in Islamic or 
Shari’a norms (38%) or in military rule (32%) rather than a mere 29% for ‘civilian’ 
democracy.47 
 
In Mukhtar, a retired ranking officer from Pakistan’s Air Force, director since 2013 but 
working for the movement since 1995 ‘in different capacities,’ the MES has not avoided 
recruiting from one of Pakistan’s two most important power establishments.  Mukhtar states 
that Ahmadis should certainly not be subjected to violence, to do so is unnatural, un-Islamic, 
barbaric and disadvantageous to national progress; in the four walls (char diwari) of their 
places of worship (ibadat gau), Ahmadis, although declared non-Muslim by the state, should 
enjoy their freedom as a non-Muslim minority, akin to Christians.  The white strip in Pakistan’s 
flag symbolises Pakistan’s non-Muslim minorities, he says. In fact, Mukhtar asserts, the 
challenges facing MES include badgumani, general stigma because of their steadfast refusal to 
declare the many Shi’a and Christian children as kafir or infidels. The literary ex-military man 
goes on: MES are working for moderation in the young to combat the ill repute that fanatics 
bring to Islam and Pakistan. The MES, via its syllabus and institutions, are not just for 
education; a national-party strategy (PAT); the Minhaj-ul-Quran Women’s League, the Minhaj 
Student’s Movement are all cited: ‘Mu’ashere ko moderate banane ke liye, (to make the culture 
moderate).’ Mukhtar talks about the manipulation of emotion in a young man that is required 
to commit suicide bombing in schools, what jihad is this? He refuses to name the Jama’at or 
any religious party but describes how the factions fostered by the Pakistani state are now 
returning to plague civil society. As a child, he saw the death of many beautiful youths in 
communal strife, what is the cause of this violence? He joined the armed forces to find a 
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solution since every individual seeks to belong to a society greater than itself. If secularism 
means no religion, Mukhtar emphatically states, or if it means no part for deen aur mazhab, 
faith or religion, in norms of governance or culture, then that is impossible: ‘to end injustice 
and to establish justice is the purpose of Islam.’ For Mukhtar, Christianity itself is also Islam, 
‘we cannot be Muslims without heeding the message of Christianity.’ He cites the history of 
violence against philosophers and scientists by Pope and clergy in Europe’s long past: ‘and this 
fostered hatred amongst the educated when insaani thought (humanist knowledge), which is 
human nature, was censored; Islam is a complete code of life.’ When asked whether only 
secularism can guarantee equal citizenship, Mukhtar answers that all beliefs and practices must 
be respected, ought we to doubt the ‘Pakistaniyat of people’?  
    
For Mukhtar, the different sects (aqaaed) of Islam, Shi’a and Sunni, or Wahhabis, Barelvis, 
are different interpretations but the foundations of belief are identical, with the exception of 
the Qadiani (Ahmadi) sect that contravenes the law, on the small matter of the principle of 
Islam, of khatme nabawut, termination of prophet-hood. This diversity, instead of being the 
cause of schism, fitna, is akin to a fragrant bouquet of different flowers. For Farooq, the director 
for curriculum and training, secularism is also about the freedom of religion: ‘Bilkul hai (there 
certainly is). And so there should be. Secularism is that people should be and are free in their 
region, in your country or in their institutions to practice their faith.’ When we pressed Farooq, 
and asked whether the state gives Pakistanis equal citizenship, he moves in an overtly political 
direction, unlike the ex-officer: 
   
That is another matter. It cannot grant this right. It may be the case in Pakistan that about 1% are prohibited from 
practicing their faith in their educational institutions but 99% are free to do so, do the 99% enjoy their rights in 
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the culture? Rights are not founded in religion but in the political realm (emphatically syasi). Mazhabi laug to 
istimal hote hein syasi laugun se (The faithful are used by politicians). And the shiddat (violence) at the heart of 
these groups is planted by politicians. They have bought the powerful in these groups/strata (tabka); they make 
social conflicts acute according to the principle of divide and rule [in English]. The basis of Human Rights (Adme-
haquq) in Pakistan is political, not religious. Until the political realm (syasi nizam) is not completely reformed, 
there will be no progress with rights; you may give as much freedom as you like. In fact, freedom [without 
complete reform] will make matters worse.      
 
When asked whether this parlous state of affairs was because of secularism, Farooq replies: 
‘Indeed. Until we have this radical reform, competent [in English] and talented people will not 
emerge.  These worthies that cannot even write their names and are elevated by money.’ Unlike 
Sohail and Mukhtar, for Farooq, the public realm is in need of wholesale reform for Human 
Rights to even have a chance of being protected.  Let us take the views on the teaching of 
English when it comes to one of the most recent moral entrepreneurs to the MES directorate. 
Saleem designs the curriculum from years 1 to 7, from age six to mid-secondary. What we 
quickly learn, in common with the other participants we interviewed, was that the species of 
moral entrepreneurship at MES does not operate with an absolute ethic.48 If you are going to 
use the culture’s resources to shape the modern nation, an absolute ethic is ontologically 
unfeasible.  Saleem, a graduate in Applied Linguistics, from Sargodha University has been 
with MES for only two years, he remained emphatic about the way English Literature provided 
‘universality’ to a curriculum because it provided MES pupils with a view of other cultures. 
The chief ideological aim of the curriculum, however, was to promote ‘moral values’ (in 
English). This functional view about the didactic power of English literature has a long colonial 
pedigree.49 ‘The moral values’ which MES are inculcating in children does not derive from 
English Literature. For this idealist, whose vocation remains strong despite the historical 
failures Freire and others have noted, moral education comes from Islam as ideology. 
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Secularism is ‘alienation from the religion,’ he says in English, ‘in one sense’ but he goes on 
to qualify this doctrinaire view about the risk for Muslims by half apologetically alluding to 
vague existential notions about some who choose to experience universality ‘beyond religious 
circles’ beyond ‘boundaries,’ or ‘circles.’ ‘They don’t like to spend their lives in a religious 
circle (in English),’ Saleem states. The greatest obstacle to the work of MES lies in the 
misconception that the reformist group is a madrassa, an adara (organisation) for maulvis 
(clerics): ‘maulviism is a stereotypical belief (in English), ‘maulvi ka matlab hai jis se wali 
bane’, not just someone who calls the faithful to pray and leads a congregation, ‘a maulvi is 
someone who helps society.’ Wali is a complicated concept to translate; it has connotations of 
spiritual authority, it means saint, beloved of God, he who exists simultaneously on a 
miraculous plane of self-knowledge and protects the vision of human perfectibility through 
faith.    
 
For ordinary life, our research project’s emphasis on political secularism as a potential solution 
to the problem of episodic communal violence had to be carefully allied to the concept of 
citizenship, shehri haquq. To the MES directorate, citizenship by development agencies entails 
the urgent necessity of revoking the Penal Code’s blasphemy laws. When asked whether 
secularism is the best way of establishing citizen’s rights, Saleem gave an interesting analogy. 
At first, he acknowledged citizens’ rights as literally a city-dweller’s rights, an odd-sounding 
locution that is sociologically correct: citizenship, as an historical assemblage in early modern 
Europe, is also impossible without mass urbanisation in the Global South.50 These rights ought 
to be implemented to reduce violence, Saleem states but after reflection, he asks us to consider 
the dilemma facing a manager who wants to treat all staff from different religions in an 
organisation equally: ‘what if you need to go beyond religious practices to give them their 
rights? Is their religious circle then consistent with your aim?’ The issue for Saleem is about 
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the degree of minimal rights or a negative conception of religious freedom to be allowed. This 
is the central paradox from our findings between the ‘rights’ (haquq) afforded a man or woman 
as part of their faith community and the state’s duty to protect the modern rights of their 
citizens, including, in the case of communal violence, from each other. Deeni haquq or the 
rights of man according to Providence have a transcendental quality, as Saleem’s conception 
of wali as the custodian of haq or the Truth suggests.  
 
Conclusion   
 
The associative task by MES management centres on developing a child’s character when 
facing the structural properties of Pakistan’s deeply unequal society. An Islamic ethos of self-
discipline is evoked so that the aleatory incentives of civic engagement against a background 
of normalised violence may be more effectively acquired by their students, ‘the caught and 
taught’ of character alluded to by specialists at the Jubilee Centre in the UK.  
 
Our qualitative data shows a character-based educational practice for children-as-citizens is 
given a variety of qualities against a backdrop of great uncertainty of prospects and of 
normalized violence. The MES is placed in a complex nexus of action and reaction. For Qadri’s 
followers, building character is a civic mission in the environs of an intensely hierarchical civil 
society where the moral technologies of the self, perfected according to Shariatic practice, see 
agency in terms of instilling a discipline where the self (nafas) is to be treated as a unique 
object of self-control. Whilst the MES is not a group that seeks to subvert the authority of the 
Pakistani state by placing ‘character’ at the centre of its practice, it certainly is attempting to 
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compensate for the failure of the state to guarantee the minimum conditions of human 
flourishing.  The political workers for the PAT reject violence as a means of legitimating their 
claim for a space in Pakistan’s civil society. Qadri’s mass movement, the MQI seeks to deliver 
the social benefits of fundamental political reform to most Pakistanis but this effort to change 
the system and not the faces, in the mantra voiced by an activist, can only be done by adhering 
to the leader’s vision. The wali’s voice is the pattern of Islam for them. The activists and 
ideologues we interviewed, however, were also acutely conscious that Qadri’s endeavour was 
only possible after making some totalising claims for their young ‘subjects.’ Why should we 
object to their claim to universality by faith that European governing elites have been doing 
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